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Dans cet article, nous reformulons les modèles classiques d’accruals dans le cadre de la théorie de 
l’investissement. Étant donné que les accruals sont assimilables à des investissements à court terme, 
nous incorporons i) les cash-flows comme proxy des contraintes financières et autres imperfections de 
marché, et ii) le q de Tobin comme mesure du rendement du capital. Puisque les données comptables, 
tels que les cash-flows, et le q de Tobin sont mesurés avec erreur, nous proposons une nouvelle 
méthode économétrique basée sur une version modifiée de la régression artificielle d’Hausman qui 
recourt à une matrice optimale pour pondérer les estimateurs à moments supérieurs de manière à 
obtenir des instruments robustes. Les résultats empiriques suggèrent que tous les paramètres-clefs 
des modèles d’accruals discrétionnaires étudiés sont systématiquement biaisés en raison de la 
présence d’erreurs de mesure.  
 
Mots-clefs: Accruals discrétionnaires; Manipulation des états financiers; Investissement; 
Erreurs de mesure; Moments supérieurs;  Estimateurs à variables instrumentales. 






In this paper, we formulate well-known discretionary accruals models in an investment setting. Given 
that accruals basically consist of short-term investment, we introduce, (i) cash-flows, as a proxy for 
financial constraints and other financial markets imperfections, and (ii) Tobin’s q as a measure of 
capital return. Accounting data, as cash-flows, and Tobin’s q being measured with errors, we propose 
an econometric method based on a modified version of the Hausman artificial regression which 
features an optimal weighting matrix of higher moments instrumental variable estimators. The 
empirical results suggest that all the key parameters of the discretionary accruals models studied are 
biased systematically with measurement errors.  
 
Keywords: Discretionary accruals; Earnings management; Investment; Measurement 
errors; Higher moments;  Instrumental variable estimators. 




  In a strict accounting framework, accruals are defined as the difference between 
earnings and cash-flows (Jones, 1991; Bartov et al., 2001). Discretionary accruals models are 
used by practitioners to assess the level of non-discretionary accruals, an important indicator 
providing information on the nature of firms earnings, and a significant predictor of stocks 
returns (Fama and French 2007, Hirshleifer and al. 2009). Despite the fact that accruals carry 
valuable information for investors, the standard models used so far to estimate non-
discretionary accruals (e.g., Jones 1991, Bartov et al 2001, Xie 2001, Kothari et al. 2005, Wu 
et al. 2007) rarely go beyond OLS estimation. However sophisticated, and even if some 
models might take into account various aspects of simultaneity bias, many do not directly 
address the problem of errors-in-variables. Noticeable exceptions include Kang and 
Sivaramakrishnan (1995), Hansen (1999), Young (1999), Hribar and Collins (2002), Zhang 
(2007), and Ibrahim (2009). However, the treatment of errors-in-variables they propose is 
incomplete in the sense that it should be complemented with an econometric approach. This 
is the primary aim of this paper.  
We revisit the estimation of aggregate discretionary accruals using a new method to 
account for measurement errors
1. We apply this method to the estimation of two commonly 
used discretionary accruals models, (i) the Jones (1991) model, considered as a benchmark, 
and (ii) the augmented Jones model including cash-flows (Dechow 1994, Zhang 2007).   
Another important contribution of this paper is the introduction of a third type of accruals 
model, where accruals are specified as short-term investment. For this third model, we adopt 
Zhang (2007) investment perspective on accruals. As he notes, “Surprisingly, little is known 
                                                 
1 On previous applications of this method see Coën and Racicot (2007) and Racicot and Théoret (2009).    4
in the literature about the investment perspective of accruals despite the fact that, by 
definition, accruals measure investment in working capital” (p.6). Following Zhang (2007), 
we thus introduce cash-flows in the Jones (1991) accruals model. The standard formula of 
accruals misses key aspects of accruals, namely the fact that accruals constitute a form of 
short-term investment, at least in terms of working capital. A noticeable exception is the 
model of Dechow (1994), which introduces cash-flows as a regressor. To deal with the 
simultaneity bias created by the colinearity between accruals and cash-flows, the author 
considers lagged cash-flows. While this procedure might be adequate to mitigate the 
autocorrelation of the error term, it does not deal explicitely with the endogeneity issue (Theil 
1953). Note that, in this third version of the accruals model, cash-flows are no longer viewed 
as a performance measure as in Dechow (1994), but as a proxy for financial constraints, as 
generally assumed in the investment literature. Given the investment flavour of our third 
accruals model, we include Tobin’s q as an additional regressor in the equation. However, the 
inclusion of Tobin’s q also adds to the endogeneity problem, this variable being measured 
with error, a well documented fact in the investment literature (e.g., Hayashi 1982, Erickson 
and Withed 2000 and 2002).  
  Usually, the basic Jones model and its variants are estimated using OLS. Sometimes 
the accruals models account for heteroskedasticity, with a form of weighted least-squares. 
But the measurements errors inherent to accounting data are often ignored. This may cause a 
serious bias in the estimation, because the orthogonality between the explanatory variables 
and the equation innovation is not necessarily satisfied. Furthermore, most studies on 
accruals are based on ad hoc models which resort to arbitrary variables to explain accruals, 
instead of a choice based on sound theoretical foundations.    5
  We aim at examining non-discretionary and discretionary accruals – the latter being 
the error term of the accruals models – bearing in mind the fact that this error term is the 
portion of accruals managed by the entrepreneurs. According to Dechow et al. (1995), 
Beneish (1997), Burghstahler and Dichev (1997), Jeter and Shivakumar (1999), Peltier-
Rivest and Swirsky (2000), Peasnell et al. (2000), Xie (2001), Marquardt and Wiedman 
(2004), Hirshleifer et al. (2004), Garcia et al. (2005) and Barua et al. (2006), firms managers 
may sometimes falsify discretionary accruals, and this may result in a statistical anomaly 
worth detecting. Indeed, since discretionary accruals are often used to forecast market 
returns, it is therefore important to resort to a robust estimation method in order to compute 
these accruals with the greatest possible precision (Ibrahim 2009). It is well understood by 
econometricians that ignoring measurement errors leads to the underestimation or 
overestimation of relevant parameters. The most dramatic implication of this omission is the 
bias resulting from the correlation of the error term with the vector of regressors.   
In this paper, we propose econometric techniques to specifically address the issue of 
errors-in-variables in discretionary accruals models. The instruments used are based on a 
weighted optimal matrix of the higher moments and cumulants of the explanatory variables 
(Racicot and Théoret 2009). We apply these optimal instruments in the classical GMM 
estimation to obtain a new estimator, the GMM-C, and run an endogeneity test based on the 
Hausman artificial regression (named the Haus-C).  In this respect, our contribution is to 
adapt this procedure to pooled data of discretionary accruals.  
In other respect, the definition of accruals includes cash-flows despite the fact that it is 
an explanatory variable in our accruals model, i.e. this is a clear endogeneity issue. To control 
for this, we replace the cash-flows variable by its predicted value, which is orthogonal to the   6
error term. A naïve approach often found in the accounting literature is to lag cash-flow to 
correct for this common endogeneity issue. While this procedure might be adequate to 
mitigate the error term autocorrelation, it is rather inappropriate to tackle endogeneity (Theil 
1953). Our results about cash-flows tend to corroborate the view according to which there are 
important market imperfections impending the Modigliani and Miller result to hold in the 
short run (Brown and Petersen 2009, Brown et al. 2009). In the context of our models, these 
imperfections might also be associated to liquidity constraints, and the preference to directly 
self-finance accruals with cash-flows before resorting to external finance (Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg 1995, Bates et al. 2009)
2. 
Our results suggest that measurement errors have a great influence on the parameters 
estimation of the basic ad hoc Jones accruals model. More precisely, our estimation of the 
Jones model reveals that important measurements errors contaminate the accounting 
measures of sales and fixed assets. The results concerning the new model of accruals we 
introduce, based on investment theory setting, are particularly interesting.  First, Tobin’s q, 
which, as the theory predicts, has already a very significant positive impact on non-
discretionary accruals when using the OLS method, displays an increased explanatory power 
when applying the new Haus-C procedure. According to the theory, it is the marginal and not 
the average Tobin’s q which influences investment. As marginal Tobin’s q – the discounted 
expected value of all marginal cash-flows of one unit of capital over its lifetime, i.e. the 
shadow price of capital divided by its cost – is unobservable, researchers often resort to 
average Tobin’s q as a proxy.  Our results confirm that this procedure is questionable. Indeed, 
this key variable seems to be plagued by serious measurement errors. Relatedly, the Haus-C 
procedure delivers a coefficient of the error adjustment regressor comparable in level to the 
                                                 
2 The fact that firms prefer self-financing over external funding is related to the pecking order theory.    7
Tobin’s q coefficient itself. As a matter of fact, we can interpret Tobin’s q measurement error 
as further evidence that firms expectations are partly incorporated in future cash-flows, a 
point often mentioned in the empirical literature on investment. In this respect, when 
introducing Tobin’s q in the accruals equation corrected for measurement errors, we find that 
the cash-flow variable has a smaller influence on short term investment. In other words, when 
measurement errors are properly accounted for, the traditional role of Tobin’s q is reinforced, 
while financial constraints seem to play a minor role, although non trivial.  
  This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our accruals models to be 
estimated with pooled data and our methodology to address the problem of endogeneity and 
errors-in-variables in the accruals models. In section 3, we detail the empirical results. 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Method  
2.1 The Models 
  Total accruals are generally defined as follows 
 
Accruals = Earnings – Cash-flows         (1) 
 
 
Accruals may also be expressed in terms of investment. More precisely, accruals may be 
defined as 
() ( ) DEP TP STD CL CASH CA TA − − − − − ≡ Δ Δ Δ Δ Δ    (2)      
where ΔCA stands for change in current assets; ΔCASH, change in cash or cash equivalents; 
ΔCL, change in current liabilities; ΔSTD, change in debt included in current liabilities; ΔTP, 
change in income taxes payable; DEP, depreciation and amortization expenses.    8
  Since we want to focus on the short-term component of investment, i.e. the working 
capital component of accruals, we propose an alternative definition which eliminates the long 
term element of equation (2), i.e. total depreciation, that is  
() ( ) TP STD CL CASH CA TA Δ − Δ − Δ − Δ − Δ ≡                  (3) 
with 
t t t A T TA ε + = ˆ                       (4) 
where  t A Tˆ  represents the estimated non-discretionary accruals, and  t ε  the discretionary accruals.  
 
2.1.1  The Jones Model of Accruals 
 















































− − − − 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,
1
        (5) 
 
where TA is total accruals; A, total assets; PPE, gross property plant and equipment at the end of 
year t; ΔREV, revenues in year t less revenues in year (t-1). Note that all variables in this model 
are scaled by Ai,t-1 to account for heteroskedasticity. This precaution also helps control for size 
effects.  
  The equation may be decomposed in two parts: the non-discretionary accruals and the 







, represents the non- discretionary 
accruals, while the innovation, εit, is the discretionary part of accruals.   9
  There are two control variables in the Jones model. The variable it REV Δ , replaced by the 
change in sales in the literature (Cormier et al. 2000), controls for the economic environment of 
the firm, and measures firms operations before manager manipulations.  In many studies, the 
estimated coefficient of this variable is found positive. However according to McNichols and 
Wilson (1988), the expected sign is actually ambiguous because a given change in revenues may 
cause positive/negative changes in the components of accruals. For this reason, these authors 
advocate the use of a specific model for every component of non-discretionary accruals. In other 
respect, to minimize income taxes, some managers might voluntarily underestimate reported 
revenues. For instance, managers can shift fraudulently to the following year merchandise 
deliveries during import relief investigation years (Jones 1991). Hence, ΔRev may be 
contaminated by measurement errors.  
 Second,  the  PPEit variable controls for the part of total accruals which actually relates to 
the (non-discretionary) depreciation expenditures. As part of total accruals, this control variable 
might be colinear to total accruals. Consequently, this variable often presents a standard 
endogeneity issue. However, some authors (e.g. Kaplan, 1979) still support this choice of 
variable and ignore the endogeneity issue. As a depreciation expense, we expect a negative sign 
of the PPEit  coefficient  because this variable measures a cash-flow reducing accruals.  This 
rationale is based on an accounting argument but is also consistent with investment theory, PPE 
being a proxy for depreciation. Indeed, investment is equal to  () 1 1 − − − = t t t K K I δ ,                 
where δ  stands for the rate of depreciation. The PPEit variable is a substitute for δ and stands 
for the long term component of investment. Hence, its expected sign is negative, with an increase 
in δ  resulting in a decrease in investment.    10
    Since this study focuses on short-term investment, measured by working capital, we omit 































− − − 1 , 1 , 1 ,
1
               (6) 
Note that the same procedure is followed for every model. First, we analyze the long-term 
version, with DEP and PPE included in the models. Second, we estimate a short-term version 
without PPE and DEP, its corresponding counterpart in the accruals variable. 
 
2.1.2  An Augmented Version of the Jones Model with Cash- Flows  
 
 
  To account for firm performance, Dechow (1994) introduces cash-flows (CF) in the 
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− − − − 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,
1
                          (8) 
  
In the context of our study, we consider the introduction of the cash-flow variable in equation (7) 
as a first step in casting the accounting accruals model in an investment perspective. Since 
accruals can be viewed as short term investments, cash-flow might be a key explanatory variable 
of the model.  In corporate finance, cash-flows are generally introduced as a proxy for firm 
liquidity constraints. If financial markets were perfect, firm cash-flows should not have a   11
significant impact on investment. Indeed, in this case, economic theory predicts that investment 
is only dependent on the marginal Tobin’s q. But if financial markets are assumed imperfect, 
firm financial structure might no longer be neutral, and liquidity constraints then have a 
significant impact on investment. In this case, a decrease in cash flows could lead to a decrease 
in investment if the firm is financially constrained or in the presence of credit rationing
3. The 
significant cash-flows investment sensitivity often found in the literature (e.g. Brown and 
Petersen 2009) also relates to financial markets incompleteness. In a dynamic framework, the 
self-enforcing contract theory (c.f.. Hart and Holmström 1987, Marcet and Marimon 1992,   
Thomas and Worrall 1994, Albuquerque and Hopenhayn 2004) suggests another interpretation 
for the presence of cash-flows as a significant explanatory variable in investment equations. 
When a firm is under financial stress, that is when its cash-flows are low, it can display a 
tendency to overinvest in order to generate future cash-flows in order to relax its expected 
financial constraint. In this case theory predicts a negative relationship between cash-flows and 
investment (Calmès 2004).  
 
2.1.3  The Tobin’s  q Augmented Accruals Model  
 
  We also introduce Tobin’s q as an additional explanatory variable in the equation of long 
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    (9)                  
 
 
                                                 
3 Note that this explanation is related to an intra-temporal model of investment, that is a static model (as opposed to 
an intertemporal or dynamic setting). In the same vein, there is also a static approach based on the theory of 
asymmetric information and agency theory. In this theory, the dynamics of investment is completely absent, and 
with the asymmetric setting, the classical positive link between cash-flows and investment obtains. A firm whose 
financial constraint is binding has no other choice but to reduce investment, because of the prohibitive borrowing 
cost it faces.    12
 
 where Tobin’s q, the shadow price of capital, is proxied by
4  
assets of value Accounting
debts of value Accounting capital of value Market +
                (10) 
As done for the previous models, we analyse the short-term version of equation (9): 
()
it
t i t i
t i or it
t i
it
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  Instead of using ROA as the yield variable as done in Kothari et al. (2005), we rely on 
Tobin’s  q as our yield measure, which additionally provides an investment perspective on 
accruals. The yield of investment is a key variable of the accruals model, because, as economic 
theory predicts, investment is only related to its yield (especially if markets are perfect). 
Furthermore, not having this variable in the accruals model tends to melt the yield and the 
liquidity constraint (cash-flows) proxying financial markets imperfections. More precisely, the 
classical theory predicts that investment depends only on its yield (according to the famous 
Modigliani and Miller theorems). In theory, investment is optimal when the rental rate is equal to 
the marginal product of capital. In other words, at equilibrium, the marginal cost of capital must 
be equal to its marginal revenue. But these theorems assume perfect markets. If markets are 
actually imperfect, the cash-flow variable becomes a potential significant regressor, as financial 
constraints tend to influence both the capital structure and the performance of the firm.  
                                                 
4 Since we work in an accounting framework, we thus rely on an accounting definition of Tobin’s q. Incidentally, 
there are many empirical measures for Tobin’s q. One popular measure used in economic studies defines Tobin’s q 
as the ratio of the market value of assets to their replacement cost. This measure is used to study firm performance. 
However, regardless the way it is proxied for, it is well-known fact that Tobin’s q remains measured with errors. 
There are many ways to account for these errors. For instance, Baele et al. (2007) use a noise-adjusted Tobin’s q to 
study banks performance. In our study, we use instruments to correct Tobin’s q for measurement errors,  a standard 
procedure in econometrics.    13
  Consequently, we have to take into account the forecasted cash-flows in the dynamics of 
investment. There is much controversy regarding the measurement of Tobin’s q, measurement 
errors creating a spurious interaction between Tobin’s q and cash-flows. Theoretically, Tobin’s q 
is a marginal concept but its observed empirical counterpart is an average one, the marginal 
measure being unobservable. Therefore, when using the average measure, cash-flows might 
embed information about Tobin’s q, such that cash-flows and Tobin’s q tend to be colinear. 
Thus, the relation between cash-flows and investment can be spurious in this case, unless we 
account for the resulting endogeneity of these variables. This matter is dealt with in the following 
section, where we present a modified Hausman artificial regression.  
 
2.2  The Augmented  Hausman  Artificial  Regression Based on Cumulants 
 
2.2.1 Instruments 
   To deal with specification errors, Geary (1942), Durbin (1954), Kendall and Stewart 
(1963), Pal (1980), Fuller (1987), and more recently Dagenais and Dagenais (1997) and 
Lewbel (1997), have proposed instruments based on higher moments and cumulants. Racicot 
and Théoret (2009) have also generalized these instruments and applied them to financial 
models of returns testing and correcting specification errors in a GMM framework. As a matter 
of fact, the literature on financial risk relies increasingly on the cumulants as more reliable 
measures of risk (Malevergne and Sornette 2005). 
  The set of new instruments we propose to build an estimator accounting for 
specification errors (and more specifically errors in variables) is based on an optimal 
combination of the estimators of Durbin (1954) and Pal (1980). To the best of our knowledge, 
this kind of procedure has never been used for studying accruals so far.    14
  To implement the Haus-C procedure, let us first assume the following general form 
β α X Y + = , where Y is the vector (n x 1) representing the dependent variables and X is the 
matrix (n x k) of the explanatory variables. Assume further the existence of specification errors 
in the explanatory variables which might create inconsistency in the estimation of the vector β. 
To tackle this issue, Durbin (1954) proposes to use as instruments the following product: x*x, 
where x is the X matrix of the explanatory variables expressed in deviation from the mean and 
where the symbol * stands for the Hadamard element by element matrix multiplication 
operator. In the same vein, Pal (1980) introduces as instruments cumulants based on the third 
power of x instead of the squares, as Durbin. Combining these instruments, we obtain a new 
matrix of instruments Z based on the cumulants and co-cumulants of x and y, these being the 
matrix  X and the vector Y expressed in deviation from the mean. This Z matrix may be 
partitioned into k vectors or series, i.e.  [ ] k z z z ... 2 1 = Z . The vector z1, which is built with 
the first explanatory variable, is the instrument of the first explanatory variable, and so on. We 
regress this vector Z on the explanatory variables to obtain x ˆ  
( ) x Z' Z Z' Z x
1 − = ˆ                   (12) 
Then the new optimal instruments 
c w ˆ  based on cumulants of the explanatory variables 
are defined as: 
] ˆ ... ˆ ˆ [ ˆ ˆ 2 1
c
k
c c w w w = − = x x w
c        (13) 
In their study, Racicot and Théoret (2009) find that these instruments are orthogonal to 
their estimated residuals. In their study, the correlation between 
c
i w ˆ  and the corresponding 
explanatory variable xi is around 90%, and the correlation is near 0 with the other explanatory 
variables. In this sense, these instruments can be considered optimal. To improve the existing 
instrumental methods used to tackle the endogeneity issue in accruals models, we thus adopt   15
the 
c
i w ˆ  instruments they developed with a modified version of the Hausman (1978) artificial 
regression.  
  Of course, our starting point is that accruals models generally present specification 
errors. These errors might be due to many causes (Spencer and Berk 1981) like the omission of 
relevant variables, the aggregation level of the data, the accounting errors or simply an 
incorrect functional form. In any case, these errors may cause some explanatory variables to be 
endogenous. Consequently, the condition of orthogonality between these variables and the 
innovation term of the accruals models is violated: the estimators of the coefficients of the 
models are no longer unbiased nor consistent. To reduce the estimation biases related to these 
coefficients, we thus regress, in a first pass, the endogenous explanatory variables on 
instrumental ones. Then, the delicate part is to judiciously choose the instruments. This is 
where the optimal instruments prove to be particularly convenient.  
 
2.2.2 The Augmented Hausman Artificial Regression 
  To detect specification errors in our sample of firms, we could use the original 
Hausman h test
5 with the following classical linear regression model: ε Xβ Y + = , where Y is a 
(n×1) vector representing the dependent variable; X, a (n×k) matrix of the explanatory 
variables; β, a (k ×1) parameters vector, and ε ~ iid (0,
2 σ ). The Hausman test compares two 
estimates of the parameters vector, βOLS, the least-squares estimator (OLS), and βA, an 
alternative estimator taking a variety of specifications, but, for our purpose, is the instrumental 
variables estimator βIV. The hypothesis H0 is the absence of specification errors, and H1, their 
                                                 
5 For details on the Hausman test, see : Hausman (1978), Wu (1973), MacKinnon (1992) and Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
(1998). A very good presentation of the version of the Hausman test using an artificial regression in the context of 
correction of errors in variables may be found in Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998). They present the case of one 
explanatory variable, whereas we apply it to the case of multiple explanatory variables.    16
presence. First note that the vector of estimates βIV is consistent under both H0 and H1, whereas 
βOLS is only consistent under H0 and not consistent under H1. Consequently, under H0, βIV is 
less efficient than βOLS.  
  Second, the Hausman test aims at verifying if “the endogeneity” of some variables, in our 
case the variables measured with errors, has any significant effect on the estimation of the 
parameters vector. Therefore, the Hausman test is an orthogonality test, that is, helping verify if 
plim (1/T) X’ε = 0 in large samples. To implement the test, we define the following vector of 
contrasts or distances:  OLS IV β β − . The resulting h test statistic reads: 
() ( ) ( ) [] ( ) () g ~ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ h
T 2 χ OLS IV
1
OLS IV OLS IV β β β Var β Var β β − − − =
−
 , with  ( ) IV β Var ˆ  and  ( ) OLS β Var ˆ  the 
respective estimates of the covariance matrices of  IV β ˆ  and  OLS β ˆ , and g the number of potentially 
endogenous regressors. H0 is rejected if the p-value of this test is less than α, the critical 
threshold of the test (e.g. 5%). 
  Third, and more importantly, note that, according to MacKinnon (1992), the h test 
might also run into difficulties if the matrix  ( ) ( )] ˆ ˆ [ OLS IV β Var β Var − , which weights the vector 
of contrasts, is not positive definite. Since this is the case with most of the accruals models we 
study, we rely instead on an alternative method to run our Hausman test. For example, assume 









0           (14) 
with  ( )
2 , 0 ~ σ ε iid .    17
and that the variables 
*
it x
6 are measured with errors, that is: 
it it it x x υ + =
*             (15) 
with  it x  the corresponding observed variables measured with errors. By substituting equation 




0 t it i
i
t x y ε β β + + = ∑
=
        (16) 
with  it i
i





* . As explained before, estimating the coefficients of equation (16) by the 
OLS method leads to biased and inconsistent coefficients because the explanatory variables are 
correlated with the innovation. Consistent estimators can be found if we can identify an 
instrument vector zt which is correlated with every explanatory variable but not with the 
innovation of equation (16). Then we regress the five explanatory variables on zt. We have: 
it i it it it w w x x ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + = + = t z γ         (17) 
where  it x ˆ  is the value of xit estimated with the vector of instruments, and  it w ˆ  the residuals of 











t w x y ε β β β + + + = ∑ ∑
= =
        (18) 
The explanatory variables of this equation are, on the one hand, the estimated values of 
xit, obtained by regressing the five variables on the vector of instruments zt, and on the other 
hand, the respective residuals of these regressions. Therefore equation (18) is an augmented 
version of equation (16). 
                                                 
6 As usually done in econometrics, we use the asterisks to designate the unobserved variables.   18


































     (19) 
If there is no specification error,  0 =
2
υi σ , the OLS estimation results in a consistent estimator 
for  i β , the parameter of  it w ˆ  in equation (18), and the coefficient is then equal to the one of the 
corresponding explanatory variable. In the case of specification errors,  0
2 ≠
i υ σ  and therefore 
the estimator is not consistent.  
  For detecting the presence of specification errors, as we do not know a priori if there are 











t w x y ε θ β β + + + = ∑ ∑
= =
   (20) 











t w x y ε β θ β β + − + + = ∑ ∑
= =
        (21)                                                               
  If there is no specification error for xit,  i i β θ = . In the opposite case,  i i β θ ≠ , and the 
coefficients of the residuals terms  it w ˆ  are significantly different from 0.  
  A significantly positive estimate of ( ) i i β θ −  indicates that the estimated coefficient of 
the corresponding explanatory variable xit is overstated by OLS regression. In this case, the 
estimated coefficient for this variable in equation (21) will decrease compared to the OLS one. 
On the other hand, if the estimated coefficient ( ) i i β θ −  is significantly negative, it suggests 
that the estimated coefficient of the corresponding explanatory variable xit is understated by   19
OLS, and consequently, the estimated coefficient for this variable will increase in equation 
(21). In other respect, the estimated coefficients βi  are identical to those produced by TSLS 
procedure with the same instruments (Spencer and Berk 1981), except that, compared to a strict 
TSLS, equation (21) also provides additional information which proves quite helpful when 
estimating the accruals.   
  In the procedure we propose to test for specification errors, we first regress the 
observed explanatory variables xit on the instruments vector to obtain the residuals  it w ˆ . Then, 
we regress yt on the observed explanatory variables xit and on these residuals  it w ˆ . This is an 
auxiliary (or artificial) regression we just described. If the coefficient of the residuals 
associated to an explanatory variable is significantly different from 0, we infer the presence of 
a specification error. In this case, a t test is used to assess the severity of the specification error. 
To our knowledge, such a test has never been used in this context. Usually, a Wald test (F test) 
is performed to check whether the whole set of ( ) i i β θ −  coefficients is significantly different 
from zero, but this ignores the case of specification errors associated to a specific subset of 
explanatory variables.   
  We can generalize the former procedure to the case of k explanatory variables with our 
modified Hausman regression. Let X be a (n x k) matrix of explanatory variables not 
orthogonal to the innovation, and let Z be a (n x s) matrix of instruments (s>k). We regress X 
on Z to obtain X ˆ :  
( ) X P X Z' Z Z' Z θ Z X Z
1 = = =
− ˆ ˆ           (22) 
where PZ is the “predicted value maker”. Having run this regression, we can compute the 
matrix of residuals w ˆ : 
( )X P I X P X X X w Z Z − = − = − = ˆ ˆ        (23)   20
and perform the following artificial regression: 
λ w Xβ y ˆ + =                    (24) 
A F test on the λ coefficients indicates whether the w ˆ are significant as a group. But we also 
introduce a t test on each individual coefficients to check whether the corresponding β is 
understated or overstated. The vector of β estimated in equation (24) is identical to the TSLS 
estimates, that is: 
( ) y P X' X P X' β β Z
1
Z IV
− = =                 (25) 
  We apply the specification error method just described to several accruals models, 
among others, to model III, which is essentially the Kothari et al. (2005) model where the ROA 
is replaced by Tobin's q. To detect specification errors in these accruals models, we run two 
sets of regressions. For example, consider model III (i.e. the Tobin’s q augmented accruals 
model). Following Kothari et al (2005), we first run the two OLS regressions using equations 
(9) and (11), for long term and short term accruals respectively. Second, we run the 
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  The estimated coefficients  i ϕ  allow the detection of specification errors, and their signs 
indicate whether the corresponding variable is overstated or understated in the OLS regression. 
Equations (26) and (27) represent the generalized version of the augmented accruals model. As 
previously mentioned, the β
* estimated in these equations are equivalent to the TSLS estimates. 
But they provide additional information about the severity of the specification errors. Indeed,   21
the φi can in fact be considered as a measure of bias of the sensitivity of accruals to the i
th 
explanatory variable. If φi  is positive, it means that the sensitivity to the i
th regressor is 
overstated in the OLS regression. The β associated to this variable will thus decrease in the 
artificial regression. And vice-versa if φi is negative. Moreover, according to our previous 
developments, we expect a high positive correlation between 
* ˆ ˆ
i i β β − , (the estimated error on 
the coefficient of variable i), and  i ϕ ˆ , the estimated coefficient of the corresponding artificial 
variable  i w ˆ . 
  We can sum up the former arguments using the following empirical equation: 
i i i Spread ς ϕ π π + + = 1 0         (28) 
where 
* ˆ ˆ
i i i Spread β β − = . According to equation (28), φ may thus be viewed as an indicator of 
overstatement or understatement of the OLS estimation for the coefficient of the i
th explanatory 
variable. That constitutes our variant of the original Hausman test. The goodness of fit of 
equation (28) provides information about the severity of the specification errors for an 
explanatory variable.   
  From equation (12), we obtain the residuals which are introduced in equation (13) to 
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This equation is proposed as a new benchmark to tackle the problem of specification errors. As 
shown in the following section, the instruments defined by Z are quite good. In other respects, 
these estimators have the advantage of requiring no extraneous information to the model. 
 
2.3  Data 
  We use a sample composed of the firms registered in the S&P500 index. The 
observations are retrieved from the American COMPUSTAT database. Data are annual and 
run from December 1989 to December 2006, for a total of 10000 pooled observations. As 
previously done by other researchers in this literature (e.g. Kothari et al., 2005), we exclude 
firms having too few observations.  
  Since the objective of this study is to shed light on the relationship between accruals 
and key investment variables, instead of analyzing industrial sectors individually, we focus our 
attention on representative firms. We thus adjust firm data for size, and run our regressions 
using pooling methods. Specific industry factors are accounted for in the augmented version of 
the discretionary accruals models using firm microeconomic data like the employment level. 
Firm pooling also offers the advantage of a more parsimonious approach for testing the 
presence of measurement errors when estimating accruals models.  
Insert table 1 here 
  Table 1 provides information on the correlation between the variables used in this 
study. At first glance, this table shows that some explanatory variables might present a 
significant degree of correlation with each other, which might cause some multicollinearity in 
regressions. For instance, the correlation between PPE and CF is about 0.7. Two other 
variables which are quite obviously related are TAXES and PPE, and TAXES and CF, the   23
respective correlation coefficients between these variables being 0.59 and 0.73. Consequently, 
we have to study accruals as long-term investments but also have to examine a second round of 
our regressions excluding PPE. This precaution is rarely considered in the literature, as 
standard accruals models often resort to this variable as an explanatory factor. We thus 
consider two equations, (2) and (4), for computing total accruals, featuring a long-term and 
short-term version respectively. The variables used to compute accruals have already been 
defined earlier.   
 
3. Results 
3.1 OLS Estimations  
  Table 2(a) provides the OLS estimation of our three long term accruals models, 
corrected for heteroskedasticity to treat size effects. Based on the adjusted R
2 (at 0.74, 0.77 and 
0.80 for the three models, respectively) the equations seem to perform quite well. The best 
model in terms of adjusted R
2 is model III. In the equation, except for ΔSales, all the 
coefficients are significant at the 99% confidence level. The Durbin-Watson are quite similar in 
the [1.98, 2.12] range. In light of the R
2, there thus seems to be no autocorrelation or non-
stationary residuals problems, which would give rise to spurious regressions.  
Insert Table 2(a) about here 
  When comparing the coefficients of models II and III, first note the similarities in terms 
of magnitude and signs of the coefficients. For instance, the coefficient of PPE is -0.0514 in 
model II and -0.0554 in model III. We obtain the same results for the estimated coefficients of 
CF, respectively 0.3336 and 0.3086 in models II and III − and ΔSALES, 0.0005 versus 0.0003. 
However for model I, the estimated coefficient of PPE is much larger, at -0.750. This finding   24
derives from the omission of cash-flow in model I, and is a clear indication of the key role 
played by this explanatory variable to properly characterize accruals. For the same reason, the 
coefficient of ΔSALES, at 0.0032 in model I, is also larger than its counterparts in models II 
and III. Our models indicate that accruals are indeed sensitive to cash-flows, which tends to 
suggest that market imperfections and financial constraints influence investment decisions. In 
this respect, our results confirm that markets imperfections play a role as suggested many times 
in the literature (e.g. Gilchrist and Himmelberg 1995), and here analyzed in the context of 
accruals and short-term investment. 
  The novelty we introduce in this kind of setting, Tobin's q, delivers quite interesting 
results. Consistent with the investment theory, this variable should positively impact accruals, 
impacting positively investment. Our results seem to confirm this relation, the Tobin's q 
coefficient being significant at the 99% confidence level.  
Insert Table 2(b) about here 
  Table 2(b) reports the corresponding results for the three short-term versions of the 
models where PPE is removed. In spite of the omission of the PPE variable in the regressors 
and the associated removal of the depreciation component of accruals, the results remain very 
comparable to those of table 2(a), both in terms of sign and magnitude of the coefficients.    
 
3.2 Haus-C Estimations  
  Tables 3(a) and 3(b) present the results of Haus-C estimations for the three models 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. Regarding the long-term versions of the models, Table 3(a) 
shows that the Haus-C regressions systematically yield lower R
2, 0.28, 0.48 and 0.39 
respectively. This suggests that measurement errors in the explanatory variables cause   25
significant biases in the OLS regressions. Furthermore, most variables are significant at the 
95% confidence level, but looking at the significance levels, model III seems to outperform the 
other models. Finally, for the three models, the levels of the Durbin-Watson do not seem to 
indicate any significant autocorrelation.  
Insert Tables 3(a) and 3(b) about here 
  Given these results and the fact that they are quite comparable among the various 
models, we focus mainly on model III to analyze further the measurement errors. As expected, 
the  i ϕ ˆ  indicate the presence of substantial measurement errors for all explanatory variables. 
First, the most commonly used explanatory variables of accruals, ΔSALES, PPE and 1/Ai,t-1,  
seem to be measured with significant error. Incidentally, the coefficient of ΔSALES changes 
substantially from one model to another, and it seems to be quite contaminated. For model III, 
its  i ϕ ˆ  is equal to -0.0612, significant at the 99% confidence level. While, for the OLS 
estimation, the coefficient of this variable is almost 0, this  suggests a severe understatement in 
the OLS estimation. The coefficient of ΔSALES is also significant in models I and III, but only  
after correction for measurement errors. This finding is in line with most empirical studies 
using the Jone’s model of non-discretionary accruals. There is also a significant measurement 
error for the PPE variable, its  i ϕ ˆ  being equal to 0.0840, significant at the 99% confidence 
level. In this case, there is an overstatement of the coefficient in the OLS regression. 
  Compared to the OLS results, the estimated coefficients of models I and III are of the 
same order of magnitude, and also comparable in sign. For example, the coefficient associated 
to PPE is -0.0142 in model I and -0.0786 in model III. For model II however, the coefficient of 
PPE is almost double, at -0.1605, with the right sign. This discrepancy can also be interpreted 
as symptomatic of the presence of measurement errors, as recorded by the  t w2 ˆ  coefficient −   26
thereafter called the coefficient of understatement or overstatement – at 0.1455, and significant 
at the 99% confidence level. Indeed, being at -0.0514 in the corresponding OLS estimation, 
this coefficient (significant at the 99% confidence level) suggests that the impact of PPE is 
overstated in the OLS estimation.   
  More importantly, based on the Haus-C method , if we look at the cash-flow variable in 
models II and III, the coefficient doubles when Tobin’s q is introduced
7. In model III, the cash-
flow coefficient is equal to 0.2866, significant at the 99% confidence level, with a coefficient 
of understatement of -0.3182 significant at the 99% level, whereas in model II, from which 
Tobin’s q is absent, the coefficient is down to  0.1435 (still significant at the 99% level), with a 
coefficient of understatement of  -0.1313, also significant at 99% level. Furthermore, the Haus-
C results also confirm the expected positive relationship between accruals and Tobin's q, the 
influence of this regressor being significant at the 99% confidence level.  In this respect, the 
coefficient of Tobin's q estimated by OLS is about 4.0897 in model III, but much higher at 
6.3103, significant at 95%, if estimated  with the Haus-C procedure. The error adjustment 
variable,  t w5 ˆ , is equal to 5.9554, and significant at the 99% confidence level, suggests a 
substantial measurement error on this variable. This is consistent with our conjecture that this 
proxy of marginal q variable is badly measured with a severe error. After correcting for 
measurement errors, the incorporation of Tobin’s q in the accruals model increases the 
sensitivity of accruals to the other explanatory variables. For instance, the impact of cash-flows 
doubles. But at this point we cannot infer the predominance of cash-flows over Tobin’s q as 
                                                 
7 Our study contradicts the results of the article of Erickson and Whited (2000), one of the few studies on the impact 
of financial constraints on investments using GMM. After accounting for measurement errors, they found no 
relationship between cash-flows and investment, rehabilitating the role of Tobin’s q as the primary explanatory 
variable of investment. Note however that, for achieving this conclusion, the authors use classical instruments and 
not higher moments and do not focus on short-term investment as we do. See also the study of Hovakimian and 
Hovakimian (2009) for a different picture of the sensitivity of investments to cash-flows.  
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previous studies adjusting for Tobin’s q measurement errors do (Fazzari et al. 1988, Caballero 
1999) with much more cumbersome numerical techniques than ours. Indeed, we use cumulants 
for correcting measurement errors in our GMM setting, a novel procedure in the accruals 
literature.  
  Table 3(b) summarizes the results obtained from the short-term versions of the accruals 
models. Not surprisingly, since model III better reflects the investment nature of accruals, the 
results confirm that it is a preferable specification if we focus on investment In other respects, 
the short-term models perform poorly in the Haus-C estimations. For example, the adjusted R
2 
is double when PPE is included in the long-term model compared to the case where PPE is 
absent. In the short-term version of the models,  the magnitude of all coefficients is altered, 
although the signs remain correct. In other words, when going from the long-term version (with 
PPE) to the short-term one, the R
2 is halved and the coefficients drop. However the 
specification remains robust, in the sense that, qualitatively, the explanatory variables are still 
significant and of the right sign. Interestingly, when excluding PPE from model III (i.e. in the 
short-term version of model III), the influence of Tobin’s q is strengthened while the impact of 
cash-flows is divided by three, and its coefficient is only significant at the 90% confidence 
level. Quite counter-intuitively, everything works as if the classical theory of investment 
applied more at short horizons, whereas financial constraints would have more influence in the 
long-run. Not only is the influence of Tobin’s q relative to cash flow higher in the short-term 
models, but it is even larger if we account for measurement errors. Actually, going from OLS 
to Haus-C, the coefficient increases from 5.22 to 8.66. Hence, when accounting for the 
endogeneity problem, the explanatory power of cash-flows seems weaker in short-term 
accruals models. This result could be of the same nature as the one reported by Erickson and   28
Whited (2000) for long-term investment. If we account for measurement errors, no relationship 
seems to persist between cash-flows and investment. This would rehabilitate the role of 
Tobin’s  q as the primary explanatory variable of investments. The finding could also be 
considered in line with the recent literature which suggests that the investment-cash-flows 
sensitivity has actually decreased consecutive to the on-going financial deepening process (e.g. 
Agca and Mozundar 2008, Brown and Petersen 2009). One explanation is that as  external 
financing becomes more available, firms financial constraints are increasingly relaxed, and the 
role of cash-flows as a cushion for financing lowered. Another argument is that firms hold 
more cash because their cash-flows streams tend to be riskier, as evidenced by Bates et al. 
(2009). Therefore, the precautionary demand for cash increases and the sensitivity of accruals 
to cash-flows is reduced.  
  More pragmatically, there is a simpler way to reconcile our finding with investment 
theory. Regardless of what was found elsewhere in the literature about long-term investment, 
we have to bear in mind that, in the short-term accruals models, there is no PPE. Since this 
variable, as often documented in previous studies, is highly correlated with cash flows (c.f. 
Table 1), it should not be so surprising to find cash flows more significant in the long-term 
version of the models, when PPE is introduced in the accruals models. In other words, the lack 
of significance of cash flows in the short-term accruals models, or, to put it differently, the 
increased significance of Tobin’s q in the short-run, is simply an artefact of the correlation of 
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3.3 Augmenting the Jones Model with Firm Microeconomic Data 
  
  Since the investment perspective provides interesting insight about accruals, it is worth 
studying further the role of variables which are likely to impact accruals or investments. 
Furthermore, instead of adopting a global approach to the study of accruals as done in our 
paper, many researchers divide accruals by industrial sectors since the behaviour of accruals 
might differ from one sector to another. Adding microeconomic data to our models might help 
control for the firm dimensions of accruals. We thus examine the impact of three additional 
variables, employment (EMP), taxes (TAXES) – both corrected for heteroskedasticity – and 
gross total return (ROA)
8.  Indeed, the role of the later is often analyzed in this kind of studies 
(e.g. Kothari et al. 2005), and considered here in combination with Tobin’s q, another measure 
of return. 
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  We compare the TSLS-hm estimation of this model, which accounts for measurement 
errors, with OLS. Table 4 and 5 report the estimated coefficients of equation (31), the OLS 
method and the TSLS-hm respectively. Both estimation techniques yield strong results as 
measured by the adjusted R
2 and DW.  
Insert tables 4 and 5 about here 
                                                 
8 Note that ROA might be seen as a substitute to Tobin’s q in our kind of setting.  
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Note that the results are similar with both estimation methods so we only discuss the case of 
the TSLS-hm experiment. A first glance at table 5 reveals that most of the relevant variables 
discussed in the literature  - i.e. ΔSales, CF, and Tobin’s q - have the expected sign and are 
significant at the 95% confidence level. The influence of our two keys financial, CF and 
Tobin’s  q, is lowered when applying TSLS-hm instead of OLS. For instance, the CF 
coefficient decreases from 0.39 to 0.27, and the Tobin’s q coefficient drops from 5.80 to 4.28. 
This confirms again that the respective weights of these two variables is overstated in the OLS 
run. 
  The negative sign of EMP/ASSET (-1) indicates that firms with a high employment ratio 
tend to invest less. Intuitively, this might be related to the fact that, by definition, firms with a 
high employment ratio are more labor-intensive and thus require less working capital. The 
positive sign obtained for the TAXES variable suggests that an increase in taxes induce firms to 
hold more working capital as a cushion, taxes reducing free cash-flows. Finally, in our model, 
return on assets (ROA) seems to have a small impact on accruals, likely because of the 
preponderance of Tobin's q in the equation. Regarding the sign of ROA, since investments 
should increase when performance, measured by return on assets, is higher, it is quite rational 
to find a positive sign in both regressions.  
A Wald test reveals that these variables - EMP/ASSET (-1), TAXES/ASSET(-1), and 
ROA - are significant as a group at the 95% level in the OLS run and at the 90% level with the 
TSLS-hm run. However, EMP/ASSET (-1) is individually the only variable significant at the 
95% level in the OLS regression. Furthermore, ROA is the only significant variable (at the 90% 
confidence level) in the TSLS-hm estimation.  
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4. Conclusion 
  In this paper, we apply an econometric method based on an improved Hausman 
artificial regression to account for measurement errors in accruals models. Our contribution is 
twofold. We introduce the Haus-C procedure and an optimal instrumental variables generator 
and apply this framework to accruals viewed through an investment perspective.  This 
approach allows us to study the impact of financial constraints on accruals. We also consider 
microeconomic variables, as employment, taxes, and ROA which also influence accruals.  
  Some important econometric problems are related to the estimation of our augmented 
accruals models. A well-known issue relates to the difficulty in properly estimating Tobin’s q 
given that it is not directly observable. As usually done in the investment literature, we rely on 
an average measure to proxy Tobin’s q. There is thus an inherent measurement error related to 
the computation of this ratio. Ignoring the appropriate correction entails an empirical 
interaction
9 between cash-flows and Tobin’s q which biases the estimated coefficients of both 
variables. We thus resort to a new estimation procedure to reduce this measurement error. 
Based on this methodology, we are able to detect serious measurement error problems in the 
basic Jones model and its augmented versions. Actually, the estimation of the augmented 
accruals model reveals that the differences between the TSLS-hm and OLS coefficients are 
substantial, which suggests the presence of significant measurement errors in all variables. 
Furthermore, when estimated with our method, the impact of Tobin’s q is strengthened in 
model III compared to the findings of the standard OLS approach. We also confirm  the 
influence of financial constraints, as measured by cash-flows, in this context, although their 
impact is reduced when introducing Tobin’s q and accounting for measurement errors.  
                                                 
9 Indeed, before correction for measurement errors, Tobin’s q may embed information on future cash-flows. Cash-
flows contain information on firm’s value, an information that should only be found in Tobin’s q if the regressors 
were completely orthogonal.    32
  Many questions remain open to investigation. For example, the economic specification 
of the accruals model could be improved. We could think of a truly dynamic setting to study 
the reaction of accruals to aggregate shocks. This might proves particularly useful for portfolio 
managers because discretionary accruals is an important variable to forecast stocks returns. Our 
approach could also be applied to panels.  That would shed light on the fixed and random 
effects at play. Another obvious shortcoming on most studies found in the accruals literature is 
that they rarely resort to proper econometric tests like unit root tests or panel data cointegration 
tests. This is left for future work.  
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Table 1 Variables Correlation Matrix 
 
ACCRU CF DELT_SALES EMP GRO_TOTRET PPE RATIO_INV_ASS TAXES Q
ACCRU 1.00 0.30 -0.04 0.09 0.02 -0.02 -0.21 0.37 0.14
CF 0.30 1.00 0.04 0.33 -0.01 0.70 0.12 0.73 -0.01
DELT_SALES -0.04 0.04 1.00 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.03 -0.01
EMP 0.09 0.33 0.02 1.00 0.02 0.39 0.10 0.27 -0.05
GRO_TOTRET 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 1.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.04
PPE -0.02 0.70 0.07 0.39 -0.02 1.00 0.41 0.59 -0.10
RATIO_INV_ASS -0.21 0.12 0.00 0.10 -0.05 0.41 1.00 0.00 -0.21
TAXES 0.37 0.73 0.03 0.27 -0.01 0.59 0.00 1.00 0.02
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Table 2(a) OLS estimation of the three basic models of accruals represented 
respectively by equations (5), (7) and (9).  
 
 
   Model I  Model II  Model III 
1/Ai,t-1  -0.1084 2.7080***  0.3892*** 
PPEit/Ai,t-1  -0.750*** -0.0514***  -0.0554*** 
ΔSALESit/Ai,t-1  0.0032 0.0005 0.0003 
CFit/Ai,t-1   0.3336***  0.3086*** 
qit/Ai,t-1     4.0897*** 
Adjusted R
2  0.74 0.77 0.80 
DW  2.02 2.12 1.98 
 
 
Table 2(b) OLS estimation of the three basic models of accruals represented 
respectively by equations (6), (8) and (11)  
 
   Model I  Model II  Model III 
1/Ai,t-1  -0.1975*** -0.2032*** -0.1338*** 
ΔSALESit/Ai,t-1  0.0040*** 0.0086***  0.0047 
CFit/Ai,t-1   0.3595***  0.2234*** 
qit/Ai,t-1     5.2361*** 
Adjusted R
2  0.71 0.73 0.74 
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Model I Model II Model III
1/Ai,t-1 1.3504*** 0.2161*** 0.6714***
PPEit/Ai,t-1 -0.0142 -0.1605*** -0.0786***









2 0.28 0.48 0.39
DW 2.10 1.20 2.11








Table 3(b) Haus-C estimations of the three basic models of accruals given by equation 
(27) 
 
Model I Model II Model III
1/Ai,t-1 1.6067*** 1.4031*** 0.4142**








2 0.13 0.18 0.21
DW 2.06 2.02 2.04
t w 1 ˆ
t w2 ˆ
t w3 ˆ
t w 4 ˆ
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Table 4 Augmented Jones’ model with microeconomic variables 
   Coefficient  t-Statistic  Prob.   
          
1/ASSET(-1) -0.5173  -2.40  0.02 
DELT_SALES/ASSET(-1) 0.0097  2.25  0.03 
CF/ASSET(-1) 0.3900  3.00  0.00 
TOBINQ/ASSET(-1) 5.8043  3.21  0.00 
EMP/ASSET(-1) -14.3180  -2.91  0.00 
TAXES/ASSET(-1) 0.1901  0.40  0.69 
ROA 0.0000  0.39  0.70 
Adjusted R-squared  0.72       
Durbin-Watson stat  2.04       
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Table 5  TSLS-hm estimation of the accruals economic model 
   Coefficient  t-Statistic  Prob.   
          
1/ASSET(-1) -0.4098  -1.89  0.06 
DELT_SALES/ASSET(-1) 0.0100 2.26  0.02 
CF/ASSET(-1) 0.2743  1.98  0.05 
TOBINQ/ASSET(-1) 4.2788  2.30  0.02 
EMP/ASSET(-1) -8.9300  -1.53  0.13 
TAXES/ASSET(-1) 0.6848  1.19  0.24 
ROA 0.0003  1.70  0.09 
Adjusted R-squared  0.72       
Durbin-Watson stat  2.01       
 
 